In a real options setting of staging, we show that it is not learning over startup's prospects per se that makes staging desirable. Rather it is the venture capitalist's informational advantage over the uninformed outsiders and the resulting`lock-in', (i.e., the capitalist's ability to further invest in better terms than competitive but uninformed outsiders) that sustains staging as an optimal¯nancing mode.
Introduction
An important feature of venture capital¯nancing is its staged structure. Venture capitalists rarely, if ever, invest all the capital that a start-up company requires to establish its business plan up-front. Instead, they invest in companies at distinct stages in their development, without making any commitments to provide future¯nancing rounds. Although this feature of venture capital practice has been recognized in academic research, almost all papers in the literature address¯nancial contracting and incentive issues that surround staging, taking the staged structure as given. Also, the existing explanations of staged¯nancing are descriptive and do not provide a formal framework.
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One common explanation for staged¯nancing is that staging the infusion of capital in the start-up provides incentives to entrepreneurial team to achieve certain milestones.
This incentive explanation suggests that the ability of the venture capitalist to deny further nancing poses a termination threat and disciplines the entrepreneur. 2 Another explanation is that staging makes use of the resolution of uncertainty over the venture's viability. Venture capital investments generally focus on business plans with high growth potential but extreme risk and a very high failure rate. In many cases, not only the business plan is very risky but also the entrepreneurial team has untested managerial ability. Therefore, learning about the start-up's prospects over time is essential. Staged¯nancing makes use of new information on the viability of a start-up's business plan or the quality of the entrepreneurial team so that parties involved in the start-up can make informed decisions. In other words, staged nancing embodies a real option value. In our formal model, we adopt this view.
Arrival of new information on the viability of the venture when staged¯nancing is adopted is clearly a convincing explanation. In a staged¯nancing structure, the venture capitalist may act upon new information and make a better decision in terms of continuation or abandoning.
1 Neher (1999) is the only exception we are aware of in its endogenous treatment of staged¯nancing. We refer to his paper shortly.
2 According to Sahlman (1990) :`Each company begins life knowing that it has only enough capital to reach the next milestone.' (p. 506) Of course, such a termination threat may cause other incentive problems. Cornelli and Yosha (1999) address the possibility that a termination threat may cause the entrepreneur to engage in window dressing, i.e., manipulate the information signal, in order to secure future rounds of nancing. They propose that convertible debt, a widely used¯nancial instrument in venture capital, corrects for this incentive. However, staged¯nancing is taken as exogenous in their model as well.
If the information revealed after an initial stage indicates that the start-up has a good chance of succeeding in its business plan, then the capitalist may be more con¯dent in providing another round of¯nancing. In case that new information rather indicates the start-up is likely to be a failure, then the venture capitalist may deny future¯nancing. Sahlman (1990) argues that the ability to abandon without any ex-ante commitments for future rounds is essential because an entrepreneur will almost never stop investing in a failing project as long as others are providing capital. But why would the entrepreneur choose to continue with the same venture capitalist, when he has access to an outside source of funds that may o®er nancing in more competitive terms? One quick and easy answer might be that the initial nancier develops company speci¯c human capital during the initial stage which becomes ex post crucial for the success of the venture. Although, this might be true in certain cases, the opposite might be the case as well, i.e., an outsider might bring a better expertise to the table. Overall, it is not clear why the entrepreneur should not approach other venture capitalists for future rounds of investment. Moreover, if entrepreneur has perfect access to other venture capitalists, would staging be possible in the¯rst place?
In this paper, we argue that initial¯nancier's ability to abandon is just one part of the story. The initial¯nancier's ability to provide further¯nancing in better terms than outsiders is a key feature that sustains staging as a superior investment mechanism. Just focusing on the implications of bad news provides an incomplete and rather casual description of the staged¯nancing process, since it exogenously assumes that the initial venture capitalist remains the main, if not the sole, source of¯nance in later stages in case of good news. In other words, the literature not only takes staging as given, but it also assumes that there is some sort of exogenous lock-in agreement between parties and that the entrepreneur is bound to obtain the future rounds of¯nancing from the initial venture capitalist. What is not clear and not investigated in the literature is that, whether staging can still be a sustainable and superior¯nancing structure when there is no binding agreement that dictates the initial venture capitalist to be the sole source of future¯nance. After all, without any commitments to receive future¯nancing from the initial¯nancier, the entrepreneur may choose to continue with another venture capitalist who may o®er better terms and initial¯nancier may end up not bene¯tting at all from the arrival of new information. In the absence of some sort of `lock-in', (i.e., ability of the initial¯nancier to provide future¯nancing in better terms than outsiders) a staged structure is not likely to be a credible mode of¯nancing in the¯rst place.
Therefore, the main issue that must be understood in a real options view of staged¯nancing is what makes the`lock-in' possible.
We claim that it is not learning on the viability of the start-up through staged¯nancing per se that makes staging desirable for the venture capitalist. Rather, it is the venture capitalist's ability to provide future rounds at better terms than the uninformed outsiders and thus extract surplus that makes staging a sustainable and value enhancing investment mechanism. We analyze a model of start-up¯nance where staging arises as an endogenous nancing schedule. Unlike the previous literature, we do not exogenously presume a staged structure. In our model, the information signal that arrives, if staged schedule is adopted, is not contractible. This precludes the possibility of any credible ex ante commitments, i.e., neither the entrepreneur nor the venture capitalist can make a commitment on continuation and termination or the source of¯nance in case of continuation. Therefore, in our framework, lock in' arises endogenously through bargaining with outside options. We model a situation where after arrival of new information, two symmetrically informed insiders bargain with the value of their outside options determined endogenously by the beliefs of uninformed outsiders about the information they have. The asymmetric information framework between outsiders and insiders endogenizes the`lock in' and enables the initial¯nancier further invest in better terms than outsiders. This ex post bilateral monopoly makes staging sustainable in the¯rst place.
Moreover, we show that this ex post ability of the venture capitalist to extract surplus due to being an insider at this later stage (since then she has superior information on startup's prospects) distorts the optimal amount of initial capital that the entrepreneur raises and invests. Therefore, there is too much investment before information revelation. In our model, once the new information arrives, the entrepreneur has the option to approach a competitive venture capitalist for a second round of¯nancing or he may continue with the initial¯nancier at the cost of leaving rents to her. We show that in all instances that the start-up is not terminated, the initial¯nancier remains the sole source of funds and extracts some part of the continuation surplus. This follows because the value of the entrepreneur's outside option (i.e., the terms of continuation with an outsider) is endogenous and an entrepreneur with good future prospects su®ers an adverse selection problem if he takes his outside option.
Anticipating this loss of future rents to the venture capitalist in case of continuation, the entrepreneur makes the process of being an insider as costly as possible for the initial¯nancier by making her overinvest in the venture before new information arrives.
This overinvestment result is quite interesting and is complementary to a previous result by Rajan (1992) in a similar framework. Rajan's main argument focuses on the possible costs of informed¯nancing. In his model, the entrepreneur anticipates a lock-in (which is exogenous) and underinvests in private e®ort since he does not capture full rents from increasing the success probability through higher e®ort. In our model, the entrepreneur borrows and invests too much before information arrives, although this has no e®ect on the¯nal payo® of the venture. The intuition is that, in a model of multi-stage¯nancial contracting where the future bargaining power of the initial¯nancier is endogenously higher due to her being an insider, the choice of initial investment becomes a strategic variable for the entrepreneur.
Anticipating this future`lock in' in the bargaining over continuation, the entrepreneur acts like a monopolist in the initial stage in pricing this`implicit option' to further invest in less competitive terms. Again, this option to further invest is implicit, because the initial contract between parties does not specify any binding clause on termination or continuation, or the source and terms of second round¯nancing in case of continuation. Ex ante, entrepreneur responds to this ex post adverse shift in his bargaining power by making the capitalist overinvest in the initial period. By doing so, he reduces his dependence on the initial¯nancier once new information is revealed and a bilateral monopoly situation over continuation arises. Interestingly, in our framework, if the venture capitalist has all the bargaining power at date 0, then the socially e±cient schedule obtains. Therefore, the source of overinvestment is entrepreneur having monopoly power over his project at date 0.
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The main point of our analysis is the future ability of the venture capitalist to extract 3 Our overinvestment before arrival of information result can also formally reconcile the empirical observation by Gompers (1998) who asks whether the venture capital market should diet:`none of the existing research indicates that current funding levels are too high.' (p. 1103) The period Gompers refers to is characterized by too many capitalists chasing too few deals in a bullish venture capital market during the heydays of .com start-ups. Clearly, during that period entrepreneurs were enjoying a great deal of bargaining power initially when raising their¯rst round of¯nancing. Our result suggests that the anticipation to have less bargaining power in future rounds might have caused them to raise and invest too much capital initially. part of continuation surplus as an insider when staged¯nancing is employed and how this lock-in' (which makes staging possible in the¯rst place) is achieved in the absence of ex ante commitments on the terms and source of future¯nancing rounds. In his comprehensive survey of actual venture capital practice, Sahlman (1990) argues that,`...while venture capitalists insist on retaining the option to abandon a particular venture, they also want to be able to invest more if the company proves to have a successful business plan and this option to further invest' is preserved by rights of¯rst refusal or pre-emptive rights. In our incomplete contracting framework, such commitments are not possible since the information signal is not veri¯able, thus not contractible. Due to the high technological nature of many start-up business plans, information revealed to parties after an initial seed investment is usually soft in nature. It may be too costly, if at all possible, to write binding contractual clauses contingent on such soft information like the performance of an early prototype or a pilot product or the results of an early tests of a biochemical process. In many instances, such contracts cannot bind the entrepreneur from raising more funds from a third party.
Some contractual arrangements might exist in reality which make it more costly to the entrepreneur to approach outsiders to raise the remaining funds. But such hurdles or exit barriers do not imply that the entrepreneur`has no outside option' whatsoever. After all, such an exit barrier might be created in principle by a clause which dictates that`no other party except the initial¯nancier might provide future¯nancing,' but in reality, we do not observe such contracts. In our framework, there is no such ex ante imposed exit barrier on the entrepreneur's ability to seek¯nancing from outsiders. The only advantage the insider capitalist has over outsiders is her superior information and this proves to be su±cient to generate`lock-in" in our model.
The idea that a¯rm with favorable information about a project it owns might su®er an adverse selection problem and not be able to raise¯nancing, goes back to the seminal paper by Myers and Majluf (1984) . They show that a high type¯rm might¯nd it too costly to pool with a low type in raising external equity and might forego a pro¯table project. In their framework, this underinvestment outcome might be avoided if the¯rm uses debt or rely on internal funds. In our model, signalling through capital structure is not possible and the¯rm (entrepreneur) has no internal funds for continuation. In the unique equilibrium outcome we describe, none of the entrepreneurs with good return prospects opt out. If they could credibly signal their private information, these high type entrepreneurs would all opt out and raise¯nancing from competitive outsiders rather than leaving rents to the initial nancier. However, in equilibrium, the value of their outside option becomes zero.
A similar idea is explored in a recent paper by Landier (2001) who endogenizes outside options for entrepreneurs who have to decide whether to fail and restart or continue with a mediocre project. The value of their outside option (failing) is the cost of funds to restart and this is determined endogenously by outsiders' belief on the type of the failing entrepreneur.
In his framework, a high type entrepreneur may choose to fail for a fresh start, rather than continuing with a mediocre project. Landier endogenizes the stamina of failure (cost of restarting) in two possible equilibria, a conservative one with high stamina of failure and an experimental one, with low stamina of failure.
The closest paper to our analysis is Neher (1999) who also attempts to endogenize staging in a venture capital context, rather than addressing¯nancial contracting issues that surround staging. Neher's model is one of perfect certainty and staging arises as a remedy to a holdup problem. Motivated by Hart and Moore's (1994) idea of the inalienability of human capital, he proposes a model where the entrepreneur cannot credibly commit to provide his human capital once the entrepreneur makes a sunk investment. Since the sunk investment is worthless without the entrepreneur, the venture capitalist faces a hold-up problem, i.e., the entrepreneur retains the right to repudiate the initial contract and exit the venture.
The resolution of this hold-up problem by ex-post bargaining may leave the capitalist with a much diminished claim. In this scenario, staged¯nancing arises as a remedy, since at every stage, entrepreneur's inalienable human capital is embodied in the physical assets of the venture and hence becomes alienable. By this staging mechanism, the value of venture's physical assets without entrepreneur grows over time and in a sense forms a collateral for the capitalist for future investment rounds. Since Neher assumes certainty over venture's payo®, there is no learning through staged¯nancing. In contrast, our model adopts a real options view of staging. We focus on the informational asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and the resulting`lock-in' between insiders that makes staging a better¯nancing alternative than up-front¯nancing.
Another related paper is by Admati and P°eiderer (1994) who focus on e±cient continuation decision in a multi-stage investment problem with exogenous staging. In that paper, like in ours, information on venture's viability is revealed only to the initial capitalist and to the entrepreneur after a¯rst round of¯nance. In their framework, the problem is the truthful signaling of information to outsiders to obtain funds for the second period. This is achieved by the insider capitalist acting as an information intermediary and revealing her information truthfully through a¯xed fraction contract. Although they do not study it, they (1994) mention the possibility of a`lock-in', i.e., the initial capitalist choosing to extract part of continuation surplus due to her superior information rather than truthfully revealing it to competitive outsiders. They argue that`the possibility exists that the insider venture capitalist can use his bargaining power to force the entrepreneur for a higher fraction of thē rm...this potential problem can be at least partially resolved if the venture capitalist has su±cient reputational assets that would be a®ected if he forces such renegotiation.' (p. 389)
In our model, the initial venture capitalist has no incentive to bring in outside parties in cases where the remaining funds are injected to the venture, i.e., she is better o® being the sole source of continuation¯nance. The plan of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we lay out our basic model of start-up¯nance. In Section 3, we study the staged¯nancing schedule and characterize the equilibrium of the bargaining game with endogenous outside options, once parties receive information and bargain whether to continue and terminate their relationship. We show that the unique equilibrium outcome is such that only entrepreneurs and venture capitalists below a threshold information signal opt out and the outside options of insiders with signals higher than this threshold level is zero (the endogenous`lock-in' result). In Section 4, we characterize the initial investment level when staged¯nancing is employed and show that staged¯nancing is superior to up-front¯nancing because of the real option value embedded (optimality of staged¯nancing). We also show that there is overinvestment in the initial period due to anticipated`lock-in' once information arrives (overinvestment result). Section 5 concludes. Unless otherwise stated, all proofs are in the Appendix.
The Basic Set-up
This section describes the ingredients of our model of start-up¯nancing. The entrepreneur does not have any funds to¯nance his project and hence needs an investor, a venture capitalist (c). The venture capital market is competitive, risk neutral and requires a zero net expected return. Therefore at date 0, entrepreneur has monopoly over the particular project in question when he takes it to a venture capitalist. We assume that entrepreneur has a discount factor¯e and capitalist has a discount a factor¯c across dates 0, 1, and 2. The outside option of the entrepreneur at date 0; if he does not undertake 4 There is also another line of theoretical research that attempts to explain the use of convertible securities in venture capital¯nancing agreements, like Berglof (1994), Cornelli and Yosha (1999) , Schmidt (2001) , Bascha and Waltz (2001) . There is no security design problem in our setting and we study the optimal choice of¯nancing mode (up-front versus staging) and the endogeneity of`lock-in' when staged¯nancing is employed. the project, is zero.
The business plan that the entrepreneur wants to pursue may be undertaken in a single period if all of $1 is invested at date 0 and entrepreneur manages the operations for one period. We refer to this mode of¯nancing as up-front¯nancing. When this is the case, the payo® of the venture is realized at date 1. We assume that initial uncertainty is such that
In other words, up-front¯nancing generates negative net expected surplus from the venture capitalist's point of view, and hence is not feasible. We also assume that Assumption 2. There exists a y ¤ 2 (0; y) such that¯cy
This assumption simply says that if there was no uncertainty, even the up-front¯nancing would be pro¯table at high enough payo® states.
Alternatively, parties may agree that only a fraction x 2 (0; 1) of the required capital is invested initially and the total required investment of $1 in the venture is spread over two periods. We call this mode of¯nancing as staged. If all required capital is provided during the two periods and entrepreneur manages the operations for both periods, then payo® is realized at date 2 and observed by both parties. In case of staged¯nancing, the parties involved in the venture's operations during the¯rst period (both entrepreneur and capitalist) observe a payo® relevant information signal at date 1. We describe this next.
Information Arrival. No matter how small, if a positive amount of capital is invested in the venture at date 0, an informative signal on the venture's prospects arrives at date 1.
This signal is observable only to the two parties, as long as they have been actively present in venture's operations between date 0 and date 1. The interpretation of this presence is straightforward for the entrepreneur: He basically runs the operations using the capital provided at date 0. For the venture capitalist, this presence can be thought of as monitoring the operations and observing the venture's progress up to date 1. Of course in reality, these activities are costly for her, but to simplify the process of being an insider, we normalize this cost to zero. Therefore, information at date 1 is only observable to`insiders' of the venture, and being an insider requires a`costless presence' up to date 1.
The information signal at date 1, which we denote by S is a random variable that is positively correlated with¯nal payo®. We assume that S has an a.c. marginal distribution 
This assumption simply means that there exists a signal value high enough to make continuation pro¯table. If this was not the case, then continuation would never be pro¯table and hence staged¯nancing would not be feasible at all. We also assume that the conditional distribution F (yjs) is such that
This means that receiving the news that the signal is at most s 0 is worse than receiving the signal s 0 :
Finally, we assume that the information signal at date 1 is not veri¯able. In that sense, our set-up refers to some relationship speci¯c learning during period 1. For instance, both the capitalist and entrepreneur may observe the quality of the research team, how entrepreneur makes decisions under pressure, or they may together have a better idea on the pro¯tability of the product as the venture develops. Therefore, information revealed to parties is soft, only observed by insiders and cannot be veri¯ed in any way to outside parties who have not been involved with venture's operations. For our purposes, one implication of this nonveri¯ability is that parties cannot contract upon the information signal at date 0. They cannot write an enforceable clause in the date 0 contract that speci¯es a continuation/termination decision at date 1, contingent on signal realization. The other implication is related to the value of terminating the relationship at date 1, which we discuss next. 
Staged Financing
Suppose, at date 0 parties agreed that venture capitalist provides an initial investment of x 2 (0; 1); entrepreneur managed the operations during¯rst period at the end of which both entrepreneur and venture capitalist observed the information signal. We now lay out and analyze the bargaining game at date 1, following the signal realization.
Bargaining with Endogenous Outside Options
At date 1, following the realization of the information signal, entrepreneur and the capitalist bargain over the expected surplus from continuing the project. The game is a standard
Rubinstein alternating o®ers bargaining game with outside options with the exception that the values of the outside options of the parties are determined endogenously in equilibrium.
Continuation requires that venture capitalist provides the remaining capital of 1 ¡ x and the entrepreneur manages the operations of the venture in the second period.
For convenience, we describe the total expected continuation surplus from the point of view of venture capitalist. Recall that venture capitalist's discount factor between dates 0, 1, and 2 is¯c: If the signal realization is s, and initial investment is x; then the total expected surplus from continuation from the point of view of the capitalist is given by
Histories and Actions of Players. At date 1, a history is speci¯ed by x 2 (0; 1).
We denote the game after any such history by ¡ (x) : The game starts at period 0 with the entrepreneur making an o®er ¼ Payo®s. We assume that ¢ > 0 amount of time passes between each period, and the discount rate for player i is given by r i > 0: De¯ne ± i = e ¡r i ¢ as player i's discount factor so that if the capitalist accepts an o®er ¼ t e (Y jx; s) ; her expected payo® is
and that of the entrepreneur is
Similarly, if the entrepreneur accepts an o®er ¼ t c (Y jx; s) ; his expected payo® is
and that of the capitalist is
Values of Outside Options. We assume that there is a continuum of identical venture capitalists and other third parties, whom we call the outsiders. These outsiders observe only the date 0 contract x and whether or not one of the parties, the insider capitalist or the entrepreneur, attempts to opt out from date 1 bargaining. In particular, the outsiders do not observe the information signal s, the period and the value of the o®er in response to which entrepreneur or venture capitalist opts out. 5 The outside market is assumed to be competitive and require a zero rate of net return.
Insider venture capitalist. We assume that if venture capitalist opts out from date 1 bargaining, then the venture is liquidated, all of this liquidation value accrues to the capitalist and the entrepreneur gets zero. What we mean by liquidation is the sale of the venture to an outsider third party or disposal of current assets at a salvage value. In particular, if venture capitalist opts out, then the venture is taken over (or acquired) by a third party who pays venture capitalist for the underlying date 1 liquidation (acquisition) value of the venture. We denote the underlying liquidation value by Q (Y; x), i.e., it depends on the initial investment x and the payo® state Y . We assume that:
is strictly increasing both x and Y , i.e., the higher is the true value of the project or the part already invested, the higher the liquidation value;
(ii) Q (Y; x) 6¯cY ¡ (1 ¡ x) ; for all x 2 (0; 1) ; i.e., the liquidation value can never be higher than the true continuation surplus. We justify this assumption by referring to the human capital value of the entrepreneur. Without the entrepreneur, the new owners of the project cannot generate a payo® higher than the true value of the project. This excludes the possibility that the capitalist terminates the relationship with the entrepreneur in order to improve value;
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(iii) The venture capitalist has the option of just scrapping the project and obtaining a payo® of zero, i.e., there is free disposal.
Actual venture capital¯nancing agreements are consistent with the above interpretation of liquidation as the venture capitalist's outside option. In particular, venture capitalists do not commit to provide¯nancing for future rounds if staged¯nancing is employed. This ability to deny further¯nancing enables the venture capitalist to terminate her relationship with the venture if prospects look dim. Venture capitalists hold superior control rights in the boards of their portfolio companies (Sahlman (1990) ). Moreover, they almost exclusively hold claims, like the so called preferred equity, which entitles the venture capitalist an absolute priority and liquidation preference. If the company is performing poorly and if the venture capitalist wants to liquidate her existing claims on the venture, she may exercise the superior control rights and impose the priority of her claims to force the company management to accept an acquisition bid or a liquidation decision. 7 We assume entrepreneur gets zero payo® in case of liquidation.
In our framework, although the capitalist may take her outside option by liquidating, the proceeds she can get depends on what outsiders believe about the signal she has observed.
Note again that x is public information at date, but the signal realization s is not observed by the outsiders. Therefore, if capitalist opts out and approaches an outsider third party, the value of liquidation for her is then determined in equilibrium as the conditional expected value of Q (Y; x) given the beliefs of the outsiders on s: In other words, outsiders condition on the event that the entrepreneur or the capitalist opts out in forming their beliefs on the signal observed and thus the expected continuation value. This further determines the equilibrium 6 For an analysis of this possibility, see Chan et al. (1990) and Hellmann (1998).
7 Venture capitalists almost exclusively hold convertible preferred security and according to Sahlman (1990, p. 509),`[m]any agreements give the venture capitalist the right to force the redemption of a preferred stock or the right to`put' the stock of the company to achieve liquidity. ' Kaplan and Stromberg (2000) argue that these rights are usually exercised to force the entrepreneur to liquidation or acquisition.
competitive contract an opting out party may o®er to outsiders. Therefore, equilibrium value of outside options depends on the beliefs of outsiders, and the equilibrium opting out behavior determines the equilibrium value of outside options. We introduce the formal description of how outsiders condition on the opting out behavior in forming conditional expectations shortly. But before this, we describe the outside option of the entrepreneur.
Entrepreneur. The entrepreneur may also opt out from bargaining with the insider venture capitalist when responding to an o®er. This simply means that entrepreneur terminates his relationship with the insider venture capitalist and raise the remaining 1¡x from an outsider venture capitalist. Since entrepreneur has no funds of his own, the total capital he raises in case he opts out and cuts a new deal with an outsider venture capitalist is again equal to 1 ¡ x: 
Equilibrium Analysis of Date 1 Bargaining
The equilibrium concept that we employ is that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). A PBE is a collection of behavioral strategies and a belief system such that each collection of behavioral strategies of a player is optimal given the beliefs and other players' strategies and the beliefs are derived from the chance probabilities and equilibrium strategies via Bayes' law whenever possible. In other words, the outsiders condition on the event that the capitalist or the entrepreneur opts out in equilibrium, as well as the initial contract x; in forming their 
Notice that Assumptions 3 and 4 guarantee that such an s ¤ 2 [0; y) exists and is unique. 
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Since the outsiders market is competitive, the capitalist receives E [Q (Y; x) jOut c ] when she opts out, as long as this value is positive: If it is negative, then, the best that she can do is to scrap the project in which case she receives a payo® of zero.k
Note that W c does not depend on t (the time the capitalist opts out) or s (the information she has); as the outsiders do not have these information. Now, suppose s < s ¤ : Then, the most that capitalist can get by continuing bargaining is
whereas the least that she can get is zero if she opts out. Therefore, all capitalists with s < s ¤ opts out on the equilibrium path.
We next show that there is a certain monotonicity in opting out behavior. 
by Assumption 5. Therefore, we have:
But, then the entrepreneur, upon observing signal s; could o®er
which the capitalist would certainly accept, and would yield the entrepreneur a strictly positive payo®, rather than the equilibrium payo® of zero. Therefore, we must have s 6 s ¤ ;
and hence no capitalist with s > s ¤ opts out on the equilibrium path. This completes the proof of Proposition 1. ¤
The above proposition completely characterizes the equilibrium behavior of insider venture capitalists and establishes the threshold information signal below which insider capitalists opt out and above which they do not. The idea is that when the continuation surplus is positive, i.e., for s > s ¤ , the entrepreneur can always make an o®er good enough so that capitalist does not opt out. For s < s ¤ ; no such o®er is possible and capitalist opts out, scraps the project and gets zero payo®. Now, we show that the equilibrium outside option of the insider capitalist is zero. In other words, a capitalist with a high signal su®ers from adverse selection in the sense that if she were to attempt to liquidate she would be believed by the outsiders to have received a signal low enough (i.e., lower than the threshold level s ¤ ) which makes the expected continuation surplus non-positive from the perspective of outsiders.
Proposition 2. In any PBE of ¡ (x) ; the outside option of the capitalist W c = 0:
Proof. Proposition 1 tells us that in equilibrium only those capitalists with a signal s 6 s ¤ opts out. Therefore, in equilibrium, the expected liquidation value conditional on opting out is
The analysis up to this point establishes that due to adverse selection, the equilibrium outside option of the venture capitalist, i.e., the payo® that she gets if she chooses to liquidate is zero. Now, we turn to the equilibrium value of the outside option of the entrepreneur. The question is whether the entrepreneur can raise the continuation¯nance from competitive outsiders in this asymmetric information setting or he would be`locked in' and continue with the initial capitalist at a cost of losing part of the continuation surplus. We show that regardless of the information an entrepreneur has over the prospects of the venture, the equilibrium value of his outside option is zero. We proceed with the same steps in establishing this endogenous`lock-in' result. Proof. Fix an x 2 (0; 1). Again, we¯rst characterize the equilibrium payo® to the entrepreneur from opting out.
Lemma 3.1. In any PBE of ¡ (x), the payo® of the entrepreneur from opting out at period t is ± t e W e where W e´m ax
Proof of Lemma 3.1. The expected payo® of the outside capitalists if they accept an o®er
Since the outsiders market is competitive, as long as¯cE [Y jOut e ] ¡ (1 ¡ x) > 0, the equilibrium o®er is
0, then, whether the o®er is accepted by an outside capitalist or not, the equilibrium payo® to opting out is zero.k Again note that W e does not depend on t or s. The next step is to prove that all entrepreneurs below s ¤ opt out on the equilibrium path. Suppose that at period t, the entrepreneur is given an o®er. The smallest o®er that could be accepted in equilibrium is
This implies that the best that the entrepreneur can get by accepting an o®er is
The best he can get by rejecting and making an o®er the next period is through acceptance
Therefore, the best that he can get by rejecting is
It follows, then, that the best payo® that the entrepreneur can get by not opting out at time
Now, suppose s < s ¤ : Then, the most the entrepreneur can get by continuing bargaining is
whereas the least that he can get is zero if he opts out. Therefore, all entrepreneurs with s < s ¤ ; opts out on the equilibrium path.
We next show that there is a certain monotonicity in entrepreneur's opting out behavior as well. 
by Assumption 5. Therefore, we havē
But, then the capitalist, upon observing signal s; could o®er
which the entrepreneur would certainly accept, as
and this would give the capitalist a strictly positive payo®, rather than the equilibrium payo® of zero. Therefore, we must have s 6 s ¤ ; and hence no entrepreneur with s > s ¤ opts out on the equilibrium path. This completes the proof of Proposition 3. ¤ Now, we show that the value of the outside option of the entrepreneur is zero as well.
In other words, an entrepreneur with high signal su®ers from adverse selection in the sense that if he were to attempt to¯nd another capitalist he would be believed by the outsiders to have received a signal low enough to make the expected surplus non-positive from the perspective for outsiders.
Proposition 4. In any PBE of ¡ (x) ; the outside option of the entrepreneur, W e = 0:
Proof: Proposition 3 tells us that in equilibrium only those entrepreneurs with signal s 6 s ¤ opts out. Therefore, by Bayes' rule,
and W e = max n 0;¯ē
We have therefore shown that if s < s ¤ both the capitalist and the entrepreneur opt out whenever it is their turn to respond to an o®er, and if s > s ¤ , neither one of them opts out on the equilibrium path. If s = s ¤ ; on the other hand, the expected surplus is zero and hence in all equilibria, whether someone opts out on the equilibrium path or not, both players receive a payo® of zero. 
Notice that continuation results in a surplus at date 1 for signal realizations s 2 [s ¤ ; y] and for lower signal realizations, parties opt out and both get zero. First, we describe how the date 0 payo® functions of the parties depend on the initial investment x. Furthermore, a higher x has no cost for the entrepreneur, and therefore his expected value at date 0 is increasing in x: However, an increase in x increases the cost for the capitalist by an equal amount, whereas, the bene¯t increases by less, because the capitalist can extract only a portion of the continuation surplus. Therefore, the net expected value of the capitalist at date 0 is decreasing in x:
Proposition 5 implies that, in designing date 0 equilibrium contract, the entrepreneur will choose the highest possible initial investment level that satis¯es the capitalist's ex ante (date 0) individual rationality constraint. In other words, due to its e®ect on the date 1 bargaining game, the initial investment level x becomes a strategic variable for the entrepreneur, as it would for a monopolist. By pricing the implicit option of the capitalist to further invest, in better terms than the uninformed outsiders, as high as possible (through the highest possible level of initial investment), the entrepreneur forces the capitalist down to her reservation level. Our last result characterizes this equilibrium initial investment level x ¤ , which sets and is determined by the following equation:
At this equilibrium initial investment level x ¤ , the entrepreneur's payo® is strictly positive, i.e., V 0 e (x ¤ ) > 0: Therefore, equilibrium¯nancing mode is staged¯nancing.
Proof: See Appendix. ¤ A corollary to Proposition 5 and Theorem 2 is that the equilibrium level of initial investment is socially ine±cient. Net expected social surplus at date 0 is given by
where¯s is the social discount factor. The social surplus is the same as the capitalist's date 0 value function, except for the possibly di®erent discount rates, and hence it is strictly decreasing in the level of initial investment. Therefore, there is a positive investment level that is smaller than x ¤ which yields a higher social surplus than does x ¤ . Also note that, since V 0 c behaves in the same manner as V 0 s (x) ; the capitalist would choose the socially e±cient investment level if she had all the bargaining power at date 0. 9 
Conclusion
In this paper, we adopted a real options setting of staging and we showed that it is not learning over start-up's prospects per se that makes staging desirable. Rather it is the venture capitalist's informational advantage over the uninformed outsiders and the resulting`lock-in', (i.e., the capitalist's ability to further invest in better terms than competitive but uninformed outsiders) that sustains staging as an optimal¯nancing mode. In our incomplete contracting framework, initial contracts can not be based on information that arrives if staged¯nancing is adopted. Therefore, termination or continuation decision or the source of continuation funds is determined through bargaining with endogenously determined outside options. We show that the adverse selection due to asymmetric information provides an exit barrier for 9 This statement is vacuous in our setting as the socially e±cient investment level is not well de¯ned. This is because, V 0 s is strictly decreasing for all x 2 (0; 1) and x = 0 can never be socially optimal. However, if we were to assume that receiving an informative signal at date 1 requires a small but positive level of investment at date 0, then the capitalist's choice of the initial investment would coincide with the socially e±cient one.
entrepreneurs with good prospects and creates an endogenous lock-in. This makes staging sustainable in the¯rst place. More interestingly, anticipating the loss of future rents to the insider venture capitalist, the entrepreneur borrows and invests too much before information revelation, in order to reduce his dependence on the capitalist in the lock-in stage.
The present model can be extended to a setting with more than two periods to endogenize the number of stages. In our setting, information revelation creates an exit barrier for the entrepreneur due to adverse selection and changes the respective bargaining powers of those involved in the venture. It would be interesting to analyze how bargaining power depends on the size of the previous investment, which in turn determines the number of staging rounds and the optimal schedule of investment, and, in particular, how the quality of information parties receive at every period a®ects the staging process.
Also, since we assumed risk neutrality, we did not investigate how staging improves intertemporal risk sharing. Another interesting extension would be to introduce a costly veri¯cation technology. Our setting assumes that information is not veri¯able to outsiders at all and our analysis suggests that the less costly to verify the information signal, the less likely it becomes to sustain staging. One might also enrich the model by addressing incentive and security design issues and combine the incentive view of staging with the real options view we adopted in this paper. We leave these questions for future research. 
Appendix
Then, the payo® to the capitalist from accepting this o®er is
Therefore, the capitalist will certainly accept this o®er, as it gives a higher payo® than she would receive by opting out or by rejecting and continuing bargaining. The entrepreneur's payo® would, therefore, be 
Therefore, the entrepreneur will certainly accept this o®er, as it gives a higher payo® than the payo® he would receive by opting out or by rejecting and continuing bargaining: i.e., opting out gives a payo® strictly greater than the maximum payo® an entrepreneur with signal s < s 0 could obtain by continuing bargaining.k 
The last inequality follows from the facts that lim and hence staged¯nancing is the unique equilibrium outcome. ¤
